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I. INTRODUCTION
Great portions of the working Constitution, while not
described or prescribed by the Document, are urged to be
merely its “applications”—or merely the “application” of
its words “as interpreted.” . . . It becomes inconvenient,
first, in lumping disparate things together: white-slaving,
railroad consolidation, Federal Trade Commission, prizefight films, radio control, drug traffic, conceivably
migratory birds, certainly [the National Recovery
Administration], (and so child labor, and barbers)—all in
one basket marked “regulate commerce among the
1
several States.”
[W]e find (once again) that the destruction of migratory
bird habitat and the attendant decrease in the population

† Editor, William Mitchell Law Review; third-year law student, William
Mitchell College of Law (J.D. expected 2002).
1. K.N. Llewellyn, The Constitution as an Institution, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 15
(1934).
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of birds “substantially affects” interstate commerce. The
effect may not be observable as each isolated pond used
by the birds for feeding, nesting, and breeding is filled,
but the aggregate effect is clear, and that is all the
2
Commerce Clause requires.
3

In the 1930s, prior to the “switch in time that saved nine,”
Llewellyn observed the broad powers Congress might take
according to a liberal interpretation of the Commerce Clause. His
prediction proved correct, and today the Commerce Clause is used
4
to justify congressional action in areas such as pollution, natural
5
6
resources, and civil rights. Yet many complain that Congress’
7
power has far exceeded that permitted by the Commerce Clause.
They point to recent efforts to extend the Commerce Clause to
domestic abuse or to gun control, issues that appear far removed
8
from commercial activity. In effect, these authorities suggest, the
Commerce Clause has been parlayed into an unlimited grant of
power.
The most vocal proponents of this view are typically
originalists—those who claim that the Constitution should be
9
interpreted according to the intent of the Framers. Originalists
2. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs., 191
F.3d 845, 850 (7th Cir. 1999), rev’d, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
3. See generally WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 21420 (1995). Prior to 1936, the Supreme Court rejected many of the New Deal
programs proposed by the Roosevelt Administration. The Court was led by the
conservative “Four Horsemen,” Justices Willis Van Devanter, James McReynolds,
George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. Their basic legal rationale was that
Congress’ actions exceeded its enumerated powers under Art. I, § 8 of the
Constitution. Id. at 214.
4. E.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264,
280-81 (1981).
5. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1977).
6. E.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
7. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 189-91 (1996) [hereinafter Epstein, Constitutional Faith]
(suggesting that Commerce Clause jurisprudence retreat to a pre-New Deal
standard); Russell F. Pannier, Lopez and Federalism, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 71, 7882 (1996) (describing Congress’ encroachment upon “general welfare” powers).
8. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(domestic violence); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567 (1995) (Rhenquist,
C.J.) (possession of a gun in a school zone).
9. See, e.g., Raoul Berger, Judicial Manipulation of the Commerce Clause, 74 TEX.
L. REV. 695, 695-96 (1996); Epstein, Constitutional Faith, supra note 7, at 182, 18889; see also Robert H. Bork, The Constitution, Original Intent, and Economic Rights, 23
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 823, 826 (1986). For a general introduction to the originalist
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claim that the Framers’ concept of commerce was greatly limited.
Even if the Framers contemplated more than the movement of
goods between states, they could not have intended commerce to
include matters of public health and safety that were deferred to
the states. Put another way, Congress’ power should be limited to a
specific, 18th- and 19th-century concept of commerce, the
10
interstate economy as the Framers imagined it. Thus, Congress’
power cannot extend to all of the institutions, and all of the
complications, presented by the modern industrial or post11
industrial economy.
To reach the originalists’ argument, the threshold issue is
whether the Framers did, in fact, expect the Constitution to be
12
interpreted according to their intent. If so, the next issue is how
the Framers intended the Constitution to function. Did they
intend the Constitution to provide a set of static, certain set of
13
principles? Or did they intend a more flexible document that
would be able to respond to the contingencies the nation would
14
face?
The answers to these questions are, at best, equivocal. The
15
historical record does not contain any certain answers, and that
16
record is constantly recast to serve ideological or political goals.
These difficulties also reflect a more philosophical issue: whether it

school of constitutional interpretation, see generally ROBERT H. BORK, THE
TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW (1990).
10. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 585-87 (Thomas, J. concurring).
11. See Ronald Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 469, 485
(1981). Dworkin calls this proposition the “negation argument.” Id.
12. See generally H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Toward a Jurisprudence of Original Intent, 11 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 5, 6-7 (1998) [hereinafter Meese, Original Intent].
14. See, e.g., Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of
Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 799-800 (1983).
15. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS’ CONSTITUTION 13 (1988); Stephen A. Conrad, Some Problems with “Origins”, 16 SO. ILL. U. L.J. 233,
234-37 (1992); James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 38 (1986); Tushnet, supra note 14, at 794-95.
16. Compare Hans W. Baade, “Original Intent” in Historical Perspective: Some
Critical Glosses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1001, 1005-08 (1991), with Raoul Berger, Original
Intent: The Rage of Hans Baade, 71 N.C. L. REV. 1151, 1156-65 (1993). Perhaps
ironically, Baade relied upon 18th-century English common law for the
proposition that legislative intent was not probative to statutory interpretation. As
a result, he interpolated that the founders did not want their intentions to guide
constitutional interpretation. Berger’s pointed rebuttal excavated the opinions of
learned English jurists from the 15th to 17th centuries.
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is even possible for modern legal scholars to put themselves in the
17
When the
place of the Framers and supply their motives.
Commerce Clause is applied to modern social and economic
institutions, the tension between the modern mindset and the
18
Framers is particularly severe.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the tension between
originalism and the modern application of the Commerce Clause.
Part II begins with the doctrine of originalism and its relevance as a
19
form of constitutional interpretation. In Part III, originalism is
revisited in the context of Commerce Clause jurisprudence. After
20
considering early scholarship, it will examine how the Commerce
Clause has evolved in Supreme Court case law, while comparing
21
that evolutionary process against originalist principles.
In
particular, three factors are considered. First, what factors drove
the development of the Commerce Clause? Second, are these
factors indicative of the Commerce Clause’s underlying purpose?
Third, how does this purpose compare with the intentions of the
Framers?
This paper does not purport to offer an authoritative finding
of the Framers’ intent. A partial examination of their intent is
instructive, but it will not be determinative. Instead, original intent
is the starting point for a broader understanding of the Commerce
Clause. The goal is an interpretive approach that respects the
clause’s purpose while accommodating the complexity of modern
society. In the words of Professor Tribe,
To the extent that information about the assumptions,
hopes or fears of those who wrote or ratified a given
provision might shed light on the provision’s original
meaning. . . [it seems] worth consulting. But the ultimate
question in every case must be what the provision in
17. E.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 433, 435 (1986); Paul Brest, The
Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 221-22 (1980)
[hereinafter Brest, The Misconceived Quest]; see also FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND
POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS 121-22 (1889).
18. See LEO MARX, THE MACHINE IN THE GARDEN: TECHNOLOGY AND THE
PASTORAL IDEAL IN AMERICA 148-49 (describing how the Framers did not anticipate
industrialization or the emergence of technology); Dworkin, supra note 11, at 486
(noting that modern institutions cannot be interpolated into the imagination of
the Framers).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.A.
21. See infra Part III.B.
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question means, not what those who favored or opposed it
22
thought.
II. ORIGINALISM AND THE DETERMINATION OF AN INTERPRETIVE
PRINCIPLE
According to originalism, constitutional interpretation should
follow the intent of the Framers. But for this approach to be
consistent, it must also be shown that the Framers intended
23
originalism. If such intention was present, then the issue becomes
24
At minimum, originalism
how originalism can be practiced.
requires that the Framers’ intent be inferable from the historical
25
record. For originalism to function as a legal theory, it should
26
provide consistent standards for determining factual cases.
A. Finding the Framers’ Approach to Constitutional Interpretation
The Framers. The historical record indicates that the Framers
considered, at least in retrospect, how the Constitution would be
interpreted. James Madison wrote that if “the sense in which the
Constitution was accepted and ratified by the Nation. . . be not the
guide in expounding it, there can be no security for a consistent

22. Lawrence W. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on FreeForm Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221, 1242 n. 66
(1995).
23. See Dworkin, supra note 11, at 497 (“Suppose we had made an initial
decision to look to the intention of the Framers, but found, when we investigated
their own theories of constitutional intention, that they did not think their own
intentions should matter at all, under any conception.”)
24. See generally Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17, at 213-16. Brest
chose to frame this inquiry somewhat differently, noting some of the practical
difficulties in determining original intent.
The first difficulty was the
identification of the Framers, whether representatives at the Convention or the
members of the state ratifying conventions. Id. at 214. Other difficulties were
what such a varied group might have intended, and the specificity with which they
sought their intent to be applied. Id. at 215-16.
25. See id. at 213-14.
26. See Tushnet, supra note 14, at 784 (noting that constitutional theory
developed in part as a means to constrain judges to standards); see also Brennan,
supra note 17, at 435 (“It is arrogant to pretend from our vantage we can guage
accurately the intent of the Framers on application of principle to specific,
contemporary questions.”); infra Part II.C. “Consistency” is not offered as an
inherent requirement of the law, nor is it meant to suggest that law should be
applied in an exact, scientific manner. Rather, this concept is meant in its
pragmatic sense—that the application of law should be reasonably predictable.
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and stable, more than for a faithful exercise of its powers.” But
Madison’s writings also point to the contrary. “[I]t must be allowed
by all that the best key for the text of the Constitution, as of a law, is
to be found in the contemporary state of things and the maladies
28
and defects which were to be provided for.”
Madison’s words are further complicated by his refusal to
29
publish his notes of the Constitutional Convention. His rationale
was that the debates of the Convention lacked any “authoritative
30
character.”
As a result, the most complete record of the
31
Convention was not published until after his death, in 1840. In
the meantime, the only records of the Convention were those of
Luther Martin and Robert Yates; both provided accounts that were
32
highly abridged and highly subjective.
27. Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (June 25, 1824), in 9 JAMES
MADISON, WRITINGS at 191 (Gaillard Hunt ed.) (1910) [hereinafter MADISON,
WRITINGS].
28. Letter from James Madison to William Cabell Rives (Dec. 20, 1828), in 3
JAMES MADISON, LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS 663-64 (1865). Perhaps with the
“contemporary state” in mind, Madison suggested that when the constitutionality
of government actions was at issue, both the judiciary and the popular will of the
electorate would constrain the government. See Donald O. Dewey, James Madison
Helps Clio Interpret the Constitution, 15 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 38, 48-49 (citing Letter
from James Madison to M.L. Hurlbert (May 1830), in 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra
note 27, at 370-75). But cf. Paul D. Carrington, Meaning and Professionalism in
American Law, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 297, 298-99 (1993). Carrington finds that
Madison intended “mere[ ] acceptance of the words embodied in the charter
itself. . . to be understood by those who ratified it.” Id. (quoting 3 JAMES MADISON,
LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS, supra, at 228).
29. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46.
30. Letter from James Madison to Thomas Ritchie (Sept. 15, 1821), in 9
MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note 27, at 71-72. Dewey also notes, “[Madison’s] view
of the relative unimportance of the Federal Convention of 1787 is surprising. He
consistently described the proceedings of this Convention as less significant than
those of the ratifying conventions for anyone seeking the meaning of the
Constitution.” Dewey, supra note 28, at 42.
31. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46. Baade’s analysis, first mentioned supra
note 16, suggests that originalism dates from this publication. He partly relies
upon the analysis of Lysander Spooner; in 1848, he was one of the first legal
scholars to examine Madison’s records. Spooner concluded that the record was
fragmentary and unreliable. Baade, supra note 16, at 1046-48.
32. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46. Dewey suggests that Madison delayed
publication just so he could have the last word against Martin and Yates. Id. On a
related point, a comparative analysis of all three accounts led one modern
commentator to believe that none were reliable. See generally Hutson, supra note
15, at 38 (including excerpts directly photographed and reproduced from the
original documents). Another commentator has noted, “If it were true that the
ratifiers wanted their intent to control . . . they can be justly accused of gross
negligence for failing to take even rudimentary steps to preserve their precious
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Even if Madison espoused some form of originalism, little
evidence appears to corroborate his point of view. Alexander
Hamilton rejected any notion that extrinsic evidence might be used
to construe the Constitution. Instead, he suggested that language
33
be applied in its obvious and popular sense. Thomas Jefferson
had a similar philosophy.
Some men look at constitutions with sanctimonious
reverence, and deem them too sacred to be touched.
They ascribe to the men of the preceding age a wisdom
more human . . . . Let us not weakly believe that our
generation is not as capable as another of taking care of
34
itself . . . .
To summarize, given a terse review of the Founding Fathers, none
35
express any clear principle for constitutional interpretation.
Other historical sources: an introduction. Another approach is to
examine early constitutional interpretation.
The Framers’
contemporaries were the first to be confronted by interpretive
issues. Their direct relationship with the Framers suggests that they
would have been best informed of, or closest to, the Framers’
interpretive approach. However, this inquiry must appreciate the
risk of projecting modern doctrine onto their efforts, which may or
may not have consciously embraced an ideology of constitutional
law.
Other historical sources: The First Congress. One early source
offers some indication of originalism. In what may have been the
first issue of constitutional impression, the First Congress debated
36
the meaning of the Treaty Clause. Their deliberations reveal a
37
desire to discover the intent of the Framers. However, when the
Framers in that Congress were asked what was intended, the
thoughts.” Boris I. Bittker, Interpreting the Constitution: Is the Intent of the Framers
Controlling? If Not, What Is? 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 9, 33 (1995).
33. Powell, supra note 12, at 915 (citing Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank, in 8 PAPERS, at 111 (Harold C. Syrett
ed. 1965)).
34. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (July 12, 1816), in
THE PORTABLE THOMAS JEFFERSON 558-59 (1975).
35. Lest the reader be misled, Jefferson was not a signatory to the
Constitution. However, his participation in the development of constitutional law
is probative. For example, many of the structures in the U.S. Constitution can be
drawn from Jefferson’s influence on the Virginia Constitution. See WILLARD
STERNE RANDALL, THOMAS JEFFERSON: A LIFE 353-55 (1993).
36. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 775 (1796); see generally Baade, supra note 16, at
1014-21.
37. 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 775 (1796).
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38

Framers balked. The record noted,
But after all, whatever veneration might be entertained
for the body of men who formed our Constitution, the
sense of that body could never be regarded as the oracular
guide in expounding the Constitution. As the instrument
came from them it was nothing more than the draft of a
plan, nothing but a dead letter, until life and validity were
breathed into it by the voice of the people, speaking
39
through the several State Conventions.
Other historical sources: Early Supreme Court decisions. The early
decisions of the Supreme Court offer another source for early
constitutional interpretation. For example, in Hylton v. United
40
States, the Court considered whether a tax on carriages violated
41
the proscription against “direct” taxes in Article I, section 9. In
the lead opinion, Justice Chase acknowledged the intent of the
42
However, his analysis began with a straightforward
Framers.
textual analysis, deriving Congress’ power of indirect taxation by
43
He bolstered this
comparing sections 8 and 9 of Article I.
argument with a pragmatic example, noting the fundamental
44
difference between taxing per person instead of per commodity.
The supporting opinions take a similar, practical approach that
45
consider the purpose and effect of the law.
38. Id. (“He should have remarked, that neither himself nor the other
members who had belonged to the Federal Convention, could be under any
particular obligation to rise in answer to a few gentlemen, with information, not
merely of their own ideas at that period, but of the intention of the whole
body . . . .. “)
39. Id. at 776. This text also supports the proposition, advanced by some, that
the “original intent” was originally understood to refer to the intent of the state
ratifying conventions. See Bittker, supra note 32, at 31. It is also instructive to
reevaluate some of Madison’s statements according to this theory. See Dewey,
supra note 28, at 40; see also supra notes 27-28, 30 and accompanying text.
40. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
41. Id. at 172-73. “No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.”
U.S. CONST. art. I § 9 cl. 4.
42. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 173 (“If the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate other taxes than direct taxes, and duties, imposts, and excises, there
is great inaccuracy in their language.”).
43. Id. at 174.
44. Id. In his example, Justice Chase posits an example where a percommodity tax is apportioned to all the citizens of a state. In states of equal
population, a state with more carriages has a higher per capita tax burden than a
state with fewer carriages. Justice Chase dryly observes the “very great inequality
and injustice” of such a scheme. Id.
45. Justice Paterson reaches the same textual implications as Justice Chase.
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These interpretive principles are further demonstrated by
46
Chief Justice Marshall’s decision in McCulloch v. Maryland. Briefly
put, the issues were whether the Congress had power to
incorporate a bank, and if so, whether Maryland had power to tax
47
it. Again, the Court relied upon textual analysis. To define what
is “necessary,” it compared that term’s use in the Necessary and
48
Proper Clause with its use in Article I, section 10. But the Court’s
textual analysis broadened to include an architectural point, noting
that the Necessary and Proper Clause is included among Congress’
49
section 8 powers rather than its section 9 proscriptions.
The
Court even draws from extrinsic sources. Where limiting language
was omitted from the Constitution, and that language appeared in
the Articles of Confederation, the Court noted that Article I powers
50
may be implied.
McCulloch also resorts to the pragmatic reasoning previously
51
observed in Hylton. Just as Justice Chase noted the impracticality
of apportioning commodity taxes to nonowners of the commodity,
Chief Justice Marshall noted the impracticality of apportioning

Id. at 176. But he then moves to more practical considerations, including the
need to distinguish land from goods, and the need for the federal government to
collect revenue. Put another way, Paterson appears to consider the purposes and
needs that the tax power was designed to serve. See id. at 178-80. He even relies
upon an extrinsic, nonlegal source to support his argument. Id. at 180-81
(quoting 3 ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS 331, 341 (1775) (*383, *386 (3d ed.
1784))). (The starred page numbers are employed for the third edition of Wealth
of Nations; for futher discussion of Smith’s work, see supra notes 109-15 and
accompanying text.) Justice Iredell’s arguments are a similar blend of textual
interpretation and practical reasoning. Id. at 181-83.
46. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). The reader will be pleased to learn that,
despite the use of this chestnut, there will be no exclamation as to what document,
if any, is being “expounded.”
47. Id. at 401, 425.
48. Id. at 413. “[The Congress shall have Power] To make all Laws which
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers,
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States. . . . “ U.S. CONST. art. I § 8 cl. 18. “No State shall, without the Consent of
Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . . . “ U.S. CONST. art. I § 10
cl. 2.
49. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 419.
50. Id. at 406 (noting that the Tenth Amendment refers to powers “not
delegated,” whereas the Articles referred to powers “not expressly delegated”).
51. See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 752754 (1999) (offering an in-depth analysis of the interpretive techniques employed
in McCulloch, and particularly noting Justice Marshall’s pragmatism).
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52

state taxes to nonresidents of the state. And the Court’s reasoning
takes an even broader step, making several inferences about the
powers of Congress from the purpose and structure of the
53
Constitution. For example, after looking at the Supremacy Clause
54
and the states’ ratification processes, Marshall infers that the
federal government acquired some sovereign power over the
55
states. He notes that many of the enumerated powers, including
collection of taxes, borrowing of money, and support of the
56
military, are facilitated by a national bank.
But the broadest
inference is that Congress’ powers must be construed in a manner
that is adapted to “the crises of human affairs,” even where such
57
powers are not explicitly supplied by the Constitution.
This brief analysis of McCulloch is not offered to prove the
correctness of the Chief Justice’s views. Rather, it shows the broad
sweep of interpretive techniques used by a contemporary of the
58
Framers.
And more tellingly, neither Hylton nor McCulloch
52. Compare Hylton, 3 U.S. at 174, with McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 428.
53. U.S. CONST. art. VI cl. 3.
54. Compare prior discussion of the ratifiers’ intent, supra notes 27-28, 30, 39.
55. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 404-06.
56. Id. at 407.
57. Id. at 415. To quote the passage at length,
The subject is the execution of those great powers on which the welfare
of a nation essentially depends. It must have been the intention of those
who gave these powers, to insure, so far as human prudence could insure,
their beneficial execution. This could not be done, by confiding the
choice of means to such narrow limits as not to leave it in the power of
congress to adopt any which might be appropriate, and which were
conducive to the end. This provision is made in a constitution, intended
to endure for ages to come, and consequently, to be adapted to the
various crises of human affairs. To have prescribed the means by which
government should, in all future time, execute its powers, would have
been to change, entirely, the character of the instrument, and give it the
properties of a legal code. It would have been an unwise attempt to
provide, by immutable rules, for exigencies which, if foreseen at all, must
have been seen dimly, and which can be best provided for as they occur.
Id. Like Justice Chase, there is a rhetorical nod to the “intention of those who gave
these powers.” Id. It is interesting to note how modern commentators have
molded this passage to support various schools of constitutional thought. Compare
Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 25 (1985)
(finding that Chief Justice Marshall was “keeping faith” with originalist principles,
and was referring to the adaptability of the enumerated powers), with Amar, supra
note 51, at 752-53 (finding that Justice Marshall sought liberal, nontextual reading
of Congress’ powers in order to facilitate the pragmatic purposes of the federal
government).
58. Although he was not a signatory, Chief Justice Marshall appeared in
arguments before the Convention. WILLIAM F. SWINDLER, THE CONSTIUTION AND
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directly pose the originalist question. That is, did the Framers
intend an indirect commodity tax? Or did the Framers intend a
59
federal bank, one that would be exempt from taxation? Instead,
the opinions are a balance of historical, textual, and pragmatic
concerns. In McCulloch, Justice Marshall even appears to reject
reliance upon the Framers.
In the course of the argument [before the Court], the
Federalist has been quoted; and the opinions expressed
by the authors of that work have been justly supposed to
be entitled to great respect in expounding the
constitution. No tribute can be paid to them which
exceeds their merit; but in applying their opinions to the
cases which may arise in the progress of our government,
a right to judge of their correctness must be retained; and
to understand the argument, we must examine the
proposition it maintains, and the objections against which
60
it is directed.
Summation. This brief review of the historical record cannot
conclusively show that the Framers did not intend originalism.
However, there is significant evidence that the Framers did not
have a unified approach to constitutional interpretation. Nor were
the Supreme Court’s early decisions made according to any
61
recognizable originalist principles.
If the Framers intended
originalism, it is puzzling that their intention was not commonly
recognized or carried out by their contemporaries.
B. The Integrity of the Historical Record
Originalism relies upon history. The Framers’ intentions,
though primarily derived from the Constitution itself, are also
determined from the records, writings, and debates of the

CHIEF JUSTICE MARSHALL 3-4 (1978).
59. From the time a federal bank was first proposed, its constitutionality was a
point of major contention, suggesting that the Framers’ intent was far from
unitary on the issue. See JOSEPH M. LYNCH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTUTION: THE
EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGINAL INTENT 109-12 (1999).
60. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 433.
61. See also Jacobus TenBroek, Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic
Aids in Constitutional Construction, 26 CAL. L. REV. 437, 445 (1938). In a broad
survey, TenBroek examined whether the Court’s decisions were concerned with
the Framers’ intent. He noted several cases where historical sources were used to
support the Court’s position, but he concluded that such usage was not pervasive
enough to be deemed a fundamental interpretive principle. Id. at 445-49.
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62

Framers.
Absent a sufficient historical basis, constitutional
63
interpreters can only speculate as to what the Framers intended.
The primary historical records are those of the Convention of
1789. As previously noted, only three records were made of the
64
proceedings, by Luther Martin, Robert Yates, and James Madison.
Of those three, Madison’s is the most complete, and it is generally
65
the favored record of constitutional scholars. However, there are
several reservations as to the reliability of any of the records of the
convention; they are far from complete and reflect the implicit or
66
explicit biases of the authors.
If intent is to be derived from sources beyond those of the
Convention itself, further difficulties arise. Some look to the
ratifying State Conventions. There is significant evidence that the
intent of the “Ratifiers,” not the Framers, was meant to inform
67
constitutional interpretation.
Yet the records of the State
Conventions are far from complete. Elliot’s Debates, the sole
68
record of the Conventions, only offers deliberations from nine of
69
the states.
In addition, because of fragmentary accounts from
70
three of the smaller states, the Ratifiers’ record is confined to the
interests of the larger states. Given the lack of uniformity in the
record, it is difficult, if not dangerous, to extrapolate the intent of
the Ratifiers.
62. See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 368 (1977); BORK, supra note 9, at 165.
63. See LEVY, supra note 15, at 285; Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17,
at 213; Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 523, 553 (1995); Powell, supra note 12, at 919-20; TenBroek,
supra note 61, at 437 n. 3.
64. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45; see also supra notes 30-32 and accompanying
text.
65. See Bittker, supra note 32, at 32; Hutson, supra note 15, at 24-25.
66. Dewey, supra note 28, at 45-46; Hutson, supra note 15, at 24-33. See also 2
WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 1009, 1012 (1953) (suggesting that Madison may have
misrepresented parts of the proceedings to suit his own political views); Letter
from James Madison to N.P. Trist (Dec. 1831), in 9 MADISON, WRITINGS, supra note
27, at 473 (“Of the Debates [of the Convention], it is certain that they abound in
errors, some of them very material in relation to myself. Of the passages quoted, it
may be remarked that they do not warrant the inference drawn from them.”).
67. See, e.g., Powell, supra note 12, at 931; see also supra note 40.
68. Hutson, supra note 15, at 13.
69. See 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, DEBATES OF THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON
THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION v-xi (2d ed. 1836) (Massachusetts,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland); 3 id. at v
(Virginia); 4 id. at iv-ix (North Carolina, South Carolina).
70. 2 id. at 185, 205, 547.
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Other extrinsic sources offer similar pitfalls. Early records of
71
Congress have been questioned on the basis of their accuracy.
Significant value has been attached to the Federalist Papers, but the
Papers were partisan documents developed in the context of New
72
York’s highly charged ratification proceedings.
More remote
historical sources are subject to criticism as well: some criticize the
73
lack of development in historical record, whereas others point to
the lack of hierarchy by which the relevance of sources can be
74
evaluated.
C. Deriving a Consistent Standard for Constitutional Adjudication
The difficulties posed by the historical record lead to a third
issue. Part of the appeal of originalism is that it provides an
75
abstract, neutral basis from which to determine the law. Instead
of permitting judges to manipulate interpretive principles to arrive
at a subjectively desirable result, originalism constrains judges to a
76
fixed standard.
Therefore, the doctrine ensures a consistent
71. See NATIONAL HISTORICAL PUBLICATIONS COMMISSION, A NATIONAL
PROGRAM FOR THE PUBLICATION OF HISTORICAL DOCUMENTS 93-94 (1954) (noting
that many of the early records were derived from contemporary newspapers);
Hutson, supra note 15, at 36-37. In particular, Hutson finds that the reporter,
Thomas Lloyd, was known for excessive drinking. Lloyd’s shorthand was cluttered
and surrounded by doodling. His transcriptions not only failed to match his
shorthand but also were attacked for misrepresenting the substance of
proceedings. Hutson, supra note 15, at 36-38.
72. Bittker, supra note 32, at 33; Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553 & n. 137
(noting a “fetish” of reliance upon one or two historical sources, especially the
Federalist Papers).
73. See, e.g., Stephen A. Conrad, Some Problems with “Origins,” 16 SO. ILL. U. L.J.
233, 234-37 (1992) (noting the lack of historical antecedents for colonial law).
74. See David M. Beatty, The Forms and Limits of Constitutional Interpretation, 49
AM. J. COMP. L. 79, 99 (2001); Powell, supra note 12, at 43. See also Robert Post,
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 13, 22-23
(1991). Post identifies some of the modern presumptions underlying originalist
analysis. In particular, he notes how historical analysis can be undermined by the
persuasive process.
The Federalist Papers are by common convention presumed to constitute
authoritative (and convenient) evidence of the intent of the Framers,
although any historian could easily demonstrate the empirical
inadequacy of the presumption . . . . [H]istorical interpretation need not
focus on the intentions of the Framers or Ratifiers at all, but may attempt
instead to ascertain consent through inquiries aimed at altogether
different kinds of evidence.
75. See JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 94 (1980); Dworkin, supra
note 11, at 469-70; Tushnet, supra note 27, at 784.
76. Lillian R. BeVier, The Integrity and Impersonality of Originalism, 19 HARV. J.L.
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result. To put this point more broadly, if all people enjoy the
consistent, predictable application of the law, then the basic
77
The
aspirations of the law—fairness and equality—are served.
issue here is whether originalism indeed offers a neutral basis for
the fair application of the law.
In the context of the prior discussion of history and
originalism, the basic inquiry was whether historical concepts can
78
be interpreted neutrally. The interpreter must first decide which
79
facts best illuminate a historical concept. This decision already
poses a value judgment, as different levels of significance are
80
accorded to different facts. Some observers feel that this decision
81
is inherently political. In the highly charged, value-sensitive field
of constitutional adjudication, it is practical to observe that any
doctrine, no matter how dispassionately executed, is subject to the
82
pressures of realpolitick.
& PUB. POL’Y 283, 284 (1996) (describing originalism as “axiomatic”); Meese,
Original Intent, supra note 13, at 11 (finding that originalism is “an enduring
standard”; decrying the “extra-constitutional tradition in which doctrine and
meaning have no fixed source and hence can easily be changed over time by
judicial fiat”); Henry P. Monoghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 353,
360 (1953) (“All of these [nonoriginalist doctrines] view the constitution as
positively forbidding ‘wrongs’— distribution of burdens and benefits by the
political process that offend some current conception of political morality.”) But see
Tribe, supra note 22, at 1224-25 (“[O]nly on rare occasions do I find . . . that the
law of the Constitution is, in the end, merely a language for pressing one’s
preferences.”)
77. Bork’s approach explores the philosophical basis of this proposition. He
frames the problem as the “Madisonian dilemma”: If the majority determines the
principles by which the minority is governed, then the majority is free to impose its
tyranny. Because “dominant” doctrines of constitutional interpretation do not
place sufficient limits on judicial power, the rights of the minority are jeopardized.
See BORK, supra note 9, at 140-41.
78. See supra note 74.
79. See Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553; Post, supra note 74, at 22-23. But cf.
Monaghan, supra note 76, at 374-77 (finding that, because some extrinsic sources
of the Framers’ intent are available, the Framers’ intent is sufficiently
determinable).
80. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
81. See Paul Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential
Contradiction of Normative Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063, 1090-92;
Flaherty, supra note 63, at 553; see also Tushnet, supra note 14, at 795-96 (“And to
the extent that the supplementary [rules of constitutional interpretation] are
based on policy grounds, the liberal project itself is defeated. . . confront[ing]
liberalism with the anomaly of relying on a particular political or social vision to
support interpretivism.”).
82. See ELY, supra note 75, at 55 (observing that “[n]eutral principles have
often served as a code term for judicial conservatism”); Flaherty, supra note 63, at
551-52 (noting that originalism should be viewed as a rhetorical construct, whose
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In addition, historical interpretation has its limits. In the case
of originalism, the historical inquiry determines not only the intent
of those long past, but also prospectively applies that intent to
modern issues. Even proponents of originalism recognize that
certain modern concepts cannot be reconciled with the intent of
83
the Framers. At this point, at this threshold of modernity, the
interpretive principles of originalism are in crisis. The principled
interpreter must abandon a particularized, neutral standard and
84
decide whether and how to apply the intentions of the past.
One way of resolving the issue is to exclude modern concepts
from the Constitution. Put another way, if the Framers did not
consider an idea, then they could not have intended the
85
Constitution to incorporate that idea. Another possible solution
is to extrapolate how the Framers would address a modern
86
This approach requires that the interpreter either
concept.
use is determined by its persuasive effect in litigation); Jonathan R. Macey,
Originalism as an “Ism,” 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 301, 305 (1996) (“[O]nce
judicial review becomes a feature of a legal system. . . there is a danger that the
constitutional text will be transformed to coincide with the political interests of
whoever is interpreting the document.”); see also Geoffrey R. Stone, Precedent, the
Amendment Process, and Evolution in Constitutional Doctrines, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 67, 72 (1988) (finding that the advocacy of interpretive doctrines is a
participatory process that democractically expresses the ideas of the community).
83. E.g., Bork, supra note 9, at 826. He says,
[Originalism] is not the notion that judges may apply a constitutional
provision only to circumstances specifically contemplated by the Framers.
In such a narrow form the philosophy is useless. Because we cannot
know how the Framers would vote on specific cases today, in a very
different world from the one they knew, no intentionalist of any
sophistication employs the narrow version just described.
Id.
84. The subsequent discussion offers three possible interpretive approaches.
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text. This conclusion has some
similarities to the thesis in Michael W. McConnell, The Originalist Case for Brown v.
Board of Education, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 457 (1996). To paraphrase
McConnell’s argument, the originalists had to either (1) find that desegregation
was not intended by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, (2) concede that
the Framers wanted a result that had become morally unacceptable by modern
standards, or (3) derive some argument by which desegregation would accord with
the intent of the Framers. Id.
85. See, e.g., Norman Dorsen, How American Judges Interpret the Bill of Rights, 11
CONST. COMMENT.’ 379, 385 (1994); Dworkin, supra note 11, at 485; Tribe, supra
note 22, at 1241.
86. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Some Thoughts on Constitutional Indeterminacy,
19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 363, 368 (finding that the Commerce Clause had been
interpreted to “create a federal power that, if candidly acknowledged at the
Framing, would have scuttled the new constitution of 1787 even before the
ratification debates began”).
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import the concept into the Framers’ world, or find an appropriate
87
analogy, and then decide what the Framers would have thought.
But this sort of thought exercise invites the sort of speculation that
88
originalism was meant to avoid.
To avoid the negation required from the first approach and
the speculation offered by the second approach, a middle way has
emerged. Here, when the threshold of modernity is reached, the
89
inquiry moves from the intent to the purpose of the Framers.
Unlike the speculative approach, this inquiry is confined to a
90
rigorous, historical determination of the Framers’ purpose.
Thereafter, if decisions are made beyond the threshold of
modernity, the decision must respect the underlying purposes of
the Framers.
But a determination of purpose runs contrary to fundamental
precepts of originalism. Purpose suggests more than simple an
expression of simple intent. It is an appeal to the extrinsic
motivations of the Framers, with a look to the ends the Framers
desired to achieve, rather than the means the Framers intended to
91
provide.
Thus, the middle way begins to resemble other
interpretive doctrines: it limits the value of the constitutional text,
and it is less likely to provide a fixed, abstract basis for adjudication.
Thus, at least in theory, originalism has several limitations. But
to explore the practical scope of these limitations, it is necessary to
observe the historical passage through the threshold of modernity.
Perhaps the most compelling illustration of this passage is the
transformation of the Framers’ nation from an agrarian society to a
post-industrial information economy.
In turn, the primary
87. See Randy E. Barnett, The Relevance of the Framers’ Intent, 19 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 403, 405 (1996); Bittker, supra note 32, at 35; Dworkin, supra note 11, at
486.
88. Brest suggests that this approach invites solipsism into the interpretive
process. See Brest, The Misconceived Quest, supra note 17, at 221-22; see also supra
notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
89. See Bork, supra note 9, at 826 (saying that where intent does not readily
supply a result, the interpreter must seek a “major premise” that states a “core
value that the Framers intended to protect”).
90. Bork also suggests that where a constitutional issue has controverted
moral dimensions, the issue falls beyond the scope of constitutional jurisprudence.
Thus, Bork presents a de facto rejection of any substantive constitutional rights
that have “moral” implications. See BORK, supra note 9, at 255-56; see also Bittker,
supra note 32, at 35 (rejecting Bork); Monaghan, supra note 76, at 363, 390-91
(offering a similar philosophy to Bork’s).
91. But see Dworkin, supra note 11, at 472-73 (finding that originalism
overlooks the purpose and architecture of the Constitution).
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constitutional provision implicated by this transformation is the
Commerce Clause. In sum, moving from interpretive theory to
actual practice, the evolution of the Commerce Clause offers the
92
opportunity to evaluate the principles and limits of originalism.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Framers’ Concept of Commerce
In his concurrence in United States v. Lopez, Justice Thomas
considered the definition of commerce under the Commerce
93
Clause. One of his considerations was intratextual, comparing the
94
power to regulate commerce to the other enumerated powers.
He noted that many of the other enumerated powers—enactment
of bankruptcy laws, issuance of currency, and establishment of
95
weights and measures—substantially affect commerce.
If
commerce included matters that substantially affected it, he
reasoned, then many of the enumerated powers would be rendered
96
superfluous.
Justice Thomas also considered the Framers’ understanding of
97
the plain meaning of commerce.
Relying upon several
contemporary dictionaries, he found that commerce consisted of
“selling, buying, and bartering, as well as transporting for those
98
purposes.” From the term’s usage in the Federalist Papers, Elliot’s
Debates, and contemporary newspapers, he further concluded that
commerce was a concept separate from agriculture or
99
manufacturing.
Justice Thomas’ definition of commerce provides a useful

92. See FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 63 (1937).
The history of American constitutional law in no small measure is the
history of the impact of the modern corporation upon the American
scene. We are still sadly wanting a comprehensive account of the
pervasive influence of corporate enterprise upon our national life, and its
judicial aspect is only very partially written in the opinions dealing with
constitutional limitations claimed for incorporated business.
Id.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 585-93 (1995).
Id. at 588.
Id. at 588-89.
Id. at 589.
Id. at 585-93.
Id. at 585-86 (citing three eighteenth-century dictionaries).
Id. at 590-92.
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starting point for an investigation into the Framers’ understanding
of commerce. As this investigation proceeds, it will be instructive to
compare his definition against other elements of the historical
record. The purpose of this investigation is not to push the
Framers’ concept beyond its boundaries, but to observe the
semantic limitations upon commerce’s meaning.
Historically, the primary purpose of the Commerce Clause was
100
to facilitate trade, between the states and abroad.
Toward that
end, Tench Coxe, a Philadelphia merchant, appeared before the
101
Convention in May of 1787.
Coxe argued for a “stronger, more
102
In particular, he focused on his
centralized government.”
manufacturing concerns, complaining of “the high rate of
labour. . . the want of a sufficient number of hands . . . the scarcity
and dearness of raw materials—want of skill in the business itself
103
and its unfavorable effects on the health of the people.”
These
issues—the distribution of resources and the availability of labor—
implicated more than the ordinary movement and sale of
commodities. Rather, Coxe had identified some of the primary
104
difficulties confronting industrialization.
It is unlikely that the Framers recognized the significance of
105
The Framers did not understand the
Coxe’s complaints.
importance of industrialization, nor did they realize how factory106
based manufacturing would alter the economy. At that time, the
concept of manufacturing itself focused upon the skilled crafting of
107
a product, not unskilled mass production.
Long-standing
concepts, such as “engine,” “machine,” and “industry,” were being
100. See CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 42-44 (1966). Cf.
CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 172-73 (2d ed. 1935).
101. MARX, supra note 18, at 150-52.
102. Id. at 152-53.
103. Id. at 153.
104. See generally WALTER LICHT, INDUSTRIALIZING AMERICA 41-43 (1995);
Winifred Barr Rothenberg, The Invention of American Capitalism: The Economy of New
England in the Federal Period, in ENGINES OF ENTERPRISE 93-103 (Peter Temin ed.,
2000).
105. MARX, supra note 18, at 148.
106. See id. at 146, 148 (noting how “[i]t did not occur to Jefferson that the
factory system was a necessary feature of technological process,” and that most
American statesmen did not anticipate industrialization).
107. Id. at 166-68; see generally MANSEL G. BLACKFORD & K. AUSTIN KERR,
BUSINESS ENTERPRISE IN AMERICAN HISTORY 98-102 (1986) (discussing the origins of
industrial production in America; America’s first textile mill was built in 1791 and
did not achieve success until 1801).
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reappropriated for the vocabulary of industrialization.
109
Technology had yet to be recognized as a concept.
Perhaps the best contemporary exposition of the concept of
110
commerce is provided by Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations.
In
the chapter “Of Treaties of Commerce,” Smith uses the term in a
limited sense, describing commerce as the movement of
111
commodities between states.
He confirms this description by
relating commerce to infrastructure: roads, bridges, canals, and
112
harbors.
But in a section discussing “the Public Works and Institutions
which are necessary for facilitating particular Branches of
Commerce,” Smith employs the concept of commerce more
113
broadly.
The “Institutions” that Smith discussed were chartered
114
trading companies, the predecessors of the modern corporation.
Although the primary purpose of the trading companies was to
import and export goods, they were also broadly vested elsewhere.
The companies’ concerns included whaling, insurance, banking,
115
water supply, glass grinding, mining, and textiles. The substance
of Smith’s critique is that the charter companies—the “Institutions
. . . necessary for facilitating particular Branches of Commerce”—
were better at handling manufacturing, or securities, than foreign
116
trade.
Thus, Smith appears to have a concept of commerce that
108.
109.
110.

MARX, supra note 18, at 166 n.
Id. at 149.
See 1 WILLIAM W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 99 (1953).
111. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS *233 (3d ed. 1784) (University of Chicago Great Books edition)
[hereinafter SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS] (“When a nation binds itself by treaty
either to permit the entry of certain goods from one foreign country. . . or to
exempt the goods of one country from duties. . . or at least the merchants and
manufacturers of the country, whose commerce is so favored, must necessarily
derive great advantage . . . .”).
112. Id. at *315-16.
113. Id. at *319. In support of this proposition, Crosskey also turns to the
original index of Smith’s work, where Smith cross-references commerce with
“Agriculture, Banks, Capital, Manufactures, Merchant, Money, Stock, Trade, etc.”
1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 100 (quoting SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note
111, at *434).
114. See SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 111 at *320, *323, *330; see also
BLACKFORD & KERR, supra note 107, at 30.
115. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS, supra note 111 at *330-31.
116. See id. at *331. Much of Smith’s critique is an indictment of the
corruption and inefficiency of the charter companies. They often were bailed out
by Parliament; the only way the companies operated profitably was under auspices
of an official monopoly. See generally id. at *326-30.
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expands beyond the movement of goods.
Other leaders among the Framers appear to adopt a similar
concept. For example, when Hamilton advocated for a national
bank in 1780, he described “several public manufactories” as “a
species of commerce,” as well as speaking of a bank as engaged “in
117
commerce.”
Prior to the Framing, John Dickinson used his
Farmer’s Letters to advocate plenary “commercial power” for
118
In
Parliament and to seek common regulation of trade.
response, Jefferson soundly criticized Dickinson’s view, saying,
Mr. Dickinson . . . not daring to question the authority to
regulate commerce so best to answer [British] purposes,
to which we had so long submitted, admitted that
authority in its utmost extent. He acknowledged in his
Farmer’s Letters that they could put down our looms,
slitting mills, and other instruments of manufacture . . . .
He therefore admitted they they might control our
119
commerce . . . .
Regardless of Dickinson’s own point of view, the power at stake was
“authority to regulate commerce.” Although Jefferson did not
agree with Dickinson’s view, he found Dickinson’s interpretation of
120
that power credible enough to merit a response.
117. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 93 (citing Letter from Alexander
Hamilton to Robert Morris (1780), in 3 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, WORKS, at 322, 334,
339, 340 (fed. ed.) (1904)). But cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 590
(1995) (Thomas, J. concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23 (Hamilton)
(finding that Hamilton viewed commerce as an independent concept from
agriculture and manufacturing).
118. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110 at 132 (citing 1 JOHN DICKINSON, POLITICAL
WRITINGS 138-42 (1801)).
119. See 1 id. at 133 (quoting Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Francois Soules
(Sept. 13, 1786)(Library of Congress), at http://memory.loc.gov [select Series 1;
select letters dated from July 23, 1786; select images 317 and 318]).
120. A comparison of other contemporary sources shows considerable
variation in the use and definition of the concept of commerce. For example,
Crosskey’s authorities include a Boston newspaper where commerce “is not
intended merely [to include] the exports and imports of the country”; a 1719
pamphlet on trade where commerce includes “all manner of Exchange in dealing”
including “Exchange. . . [of] Labour either for Labour or Wages”; and a Virginia
newspaper article soliciting support for a textile factory, “not doubting but by
proper caution and a regularity of commerce, they will be able, after a short time,
to manufacture as low as imported.” In addition to the Federalist Papers, Justice
Thomas relies in part upon some contemporary newspapers, which note that
agriculture is a “source of commerce,” and that manufacturing is a beneficiary of
commerce; and upon Elliot’s Debates, where a delegate to the North Carolina
convention described commerce as the “nurse” of agriculture and manufacturing.
Compare 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 91-93, with Lopez, 514 U.S. at 590.
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At this point, it is interesting to return to Tench Coxe, who
joined the Washington Administration as an Assistant Secretary of
121
In his Sketch of the General Trade of the United
the Treasury.
States, Coxe purported to take a “survey of the American
122
In particular, Coxe discussed shipbuilding, fishing,
commerce.”
and agriculture; he also observed the difficulties American farmers
123
were having in obtaining credit for their goods abroad.
Coxe’s
statements do not unequivocally define commerce, but they show
how broad economic analysis had acquired and was changing the
concept of commerce.
In any case, the historical record is far from disclosing any
certain definition for commerce. Instead, it appears that even at
the time of the Framers, there was significant disparity in both the
124
understanding and application of the concept.
Because of this
indeterminacy, scholars struggled to provide a clear indication of
125
constitutional power.
Two noted scholars opted for a liberal
reading of commerce. For example, John Taylor said,
The whole property and wealth of the country are more
nearly connected with commerce, than roads are with war;
and the mode of reasoning in that case will embrace
agriculture, and invest Congress with a power of
regulating that also, as is attempted by making it tributary
126
to manufactures.
Justice Story’s seminal treatise, Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, further expands Taylor’s
127
theme. After noting the nation’s economic difficulties under the
Articles, Justice Story found that under the Constitution the
concept of commerce must be understood liberally, in its “general

121. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 110, at 87 (citing Tench Coxe, A Sketch of the
General Trade of the United States, in A VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 337-44
(1794)).
122. Id.
123. Id.; see also Tench Coxe, A Sketch of the General Trade of the United States, in A
VIEW OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 340-41 (1974).
124. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
125. See JOHN TAYLOR, CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUED AND CONSTITUTIONS
VINDICATED 22 (1820) (raising the concern that “chains of inferences” would be
used to overextend federal power).
126. Id. at 221. It is interesting to compare this statement with Taylor’s
sentiments regarding federal power. See supra note 125.
127. For further information on Justice Story’s influence on early
constitutional jurisprudence, see R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
JOSEPH STORY (1985).
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128

sense.” He then addresses the controversy surrounding the scope
of the concept, which eerily mirrors the modern debate: some favor
a narrow interpretation, limiting Congress to its enumerated
powers and avoiding federal interference in state affairs; others
favor a broad interpretation, allowing Congress to facilitate
domestic industry and prevent the interference of foreign
129
powers. Justice Story concludes,
[I]f congress does not possess the power to encourage
domestic manufactures by regulations of commerce, the
power is annihilated for the entire nation. . . . No man
can doubt, that domestic agriculture and manufactures
may be most essentially promoted and protected by
regulations of commerce. No man can doubt, that it is
the most usual, and generally the most efficient means of
130
producing those results.
At the time of the Framing, both the nation’s economy and
the concept of commerce were in transition. The Framers may
have been aware of the changes industrialization were bringing, but
they could not anticipate its revolutionary dimensions. Yet both
the Framers themselves, and other contemporaries, were struggling
to create a vocabulary to describe the change. This struggle is
shown by the controversy that surrounded the definition of
commerce. Its usage and meaning was far from consistent. But
even at that time, some advocated a liberal construction of
commerce, a construction that would include manufacturing and
agriculture. By doing so, they worked toward a concept that would
keep apace with emerging economic changes.
B. Development in the Supreme Court
The historical record has disclosed, at minimum, the
ambiguities that surround the concept of commerce.
By
examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, this amorphous
concept is tailored by a more concrete inquiry. By necessity, the
Court is constrained to develop an adjudicative standard, one that
must necessarily place limits on how commerce is understood to
apply to real-world facts. However, this standard is not an absolute.
First, the Court does not necessarily provide a particularized
128. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES
STATES §§ 1054, 1057 (1833).
129. See 2 id. §§ 1075, 1076.
130. See 2 id. § 1080.
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definition. Second, the Court’s determinations are limited by the
facts before it. And third, just as the facts before the Court increase
in complexity over time, so must its holdings account for that
131
complexity.
Therefore, the purpose of this survey of the Court’s case law is
not intended to provide any particularized standard. Instead, the
purpose of this survey is to examine some of the boundaries placed
on the concept of commerce, and to track the evolution of those
boundaries over time. In the final analysis, the question is whether
some underlying principle can account for the changes that have
taken place.
The natural starting point for this analysis is the Court’s first
132
major Commerce Clause case, Gibbons v. Ogden. In that case, the
plaintiffs challenged a New York law that gave the defendants an
133
Before
exclusive franchise over all navigable waters in the state.
reaching the substantive issues, Chief Justice Marshall first
considered what principles should guide the interpretation of the
134
Constitution.
After noting that there was no textual principle
135
that required strict construction,
he rejected the principle,
saying,
If they contend for that narrow construction which, in
support of some theory not to be found in the
constitution, would deny to the government those powers
which the words of the grant, as usually understood,
import, and which are consistent with the general views
and objects of the instrument; for that narrow
construction, which would cripple the government, and
would render it unequal to the object for which it is
declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given,
as fairly understood, render it competent; then we cannot
perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor
adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be
136
expounded.
131. See generally Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional
Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 155, 226-27 (1997).
132. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824); see FRANKFURTER, supra note 92, at 13-15.
133. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 1-2.
134. See id. at 187-88.
135. Id. (“It has been said, that [the enumerated powers] ought to be
construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence
in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule?”).
136. Id. at 188. Cf. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 202-03
(1819) (finding that departure from the “plain meaning” of the Constitution was
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Chief Justice Marshall went on to define the scope of
Commerce Clause power. He rejected limiting it to “traffic, buying
137
Then, after
and selling, or the interchange of commodities.”
noting the importance of navigation to trade, he found that it was
138
an essential element of Congress’ Commerce Clause powers. But
Chief Justice Marshall goes even further, unambiguously seeking to
extend the breadth of the Commerce Clause. Rather than
restricting it to simple passage between states, he finds, “Commerce
among the States, cannot stop at the external boundary line of
139
each State, but may be introduced into the interior.”
Only after laying this broad foundation does Chief Justice
Marshall move to the most ambitious part of the decision, the
140
recognition of the “dormant” Commerce Clause.
In a structural
argument, he finds that where state power is inconsistent with the
141
Interestingly, the
federal power, the federal power controls.
Chief Justice did not attempt to demonstrate where the precise
conflict of powers had occurred, or how the exercise of power by
one negated the power of the other. Instead, without further
analysis, he relied upon his prior, broad assessment of commerce to
both prove the conflict and permit implementation of the
142
doctrine.
By contrast, the limits of the Commerce Clause were more
143
Here, Pennsylvania
clearly drawn in Cooley v. Board of Wardens.
passed a law requiring that vessels on the Delaware River obtain a
144
local river pilot.
In his opinion, Justice Curtis conceded
warranted only where “the absurdity and injustice” of such interpretation was
clearly obvious).
137. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90. In one of Chief Justice Marshall’s more
oracular statements, he describes commerce as “intercourse,” without necessarily
distinguishing the term from ordinary traffic or trade. See id.
138. Id. at 193-94. The Chief Justice also supports his argument intratextually,
relying upon Art. I § 9 cl. 1. The clause barred Congress, prior to 1808, from
prohibiting the “migration or importation” of slaves. Noting that the clause “has
always been considered as an exception from the power to regulate commerce,”
he found that commerce must otherwise include migration and importation. He
also drew what, from the modern perspective, is a fairly disturbing analogy
between the voluntary and involuntary transportation of persons. See id. at 206-07,
216-17.
139. Id. at 194.
140. See generally 1 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.4 (3d ed. 1999).
141. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 205-06.
142. See id.
143. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
144. Id. at 311-12.
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145

Congress’ power to regulate navigation.
But he held that river
146
pilots did not fall within this category. To place this limit on the
Commerce Clause, he discussed the purposes for which the
Commerce Clause was intended.
Now, the power to regulate commerce, embraces a vast
field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various
subjects, quite unlike in their natures; some imperatively
demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on
the commerce of the United States in every port; and
some, like the subject now in question, as imperatively
demanding that diversity, which alone can meet the local
147
necessities of navigation.
Put another way, Justice Curtis considered whether federal
regulation was necessary, or whether local regulation best suited
the issue. Instead of applying a traditional police power analysis—
asking whether the issue was a matter of public health and safety—
148
he examined the practical effects of the regulation. After noting
that local pilots are far better suited to the task than could possibly
be dictated by the federal government, Justice Curtis held that the
149
power to regulate local pilots was outside the Commerce Clause.
At this point, the boundaries of the Commerce Clause are
responding to two competing ideas. Chief Justice Marshall set out
a broad, amorphous concept, providing that the Commerce Clause
power can act both between the states and within the states. While
150
he acknowledges that the states must retain some powers, he also
takes care to avoid a determinate separation of powers between the
federal government and the states, implicitly leaving the door open
for greater exercise of federal power. By contrast, while adverting
to matters that “imperatively demand” federal control, Justice
Curtis articulates a limiting principle. Part of his argument is an
abstract calculation of power: he notes how unchecked federal
power, in and of itself, both disempowers the states and
151
deconstructs the federal system.
But he also offers a pragmatic
analysis: if a matter only has local effects, or can best be served by

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 315.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319.
Id. at 320.
Id.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 203-04.
Cooley, 53 U.S. at 318-19.
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152

local expertise, he finds that the state should control.
When modern technology is introduced, it becomes more
difficult to determine whether state or federal regulation can be
effective. For example, in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union
Telegraph Co., the Court had to decide between state and federal
153
control of communications technology.
Congress had passed a
law that gave all telegraph companies the right to build lines upon
154
all federal waters and lands, including railroad rights-of-way.
Florida granted Pensacola Telegraph the exclusive right to build
telegraph lines in two Florida counties, and Western Union
155
challenged the grant, relying upon the federal law.
In an opinion by Chief Justice Waite, the Court ruled in favor
of the federal law, finding Congress had power under the
156
Commerce Clause.
Discussing the new technology, the Chief
Justice did not attempt to redefine commerce, but instead
examined the evolution of the commerce power itself.
The powers thus granted are not confined to the
instrumentalities of commerce. . . but they keep pace with
the progress of the country, and adapt themselves to the
new developments of time and circumstances. They
extend from the horse and its rider to the stage-coach,
from the sailing vessel to the steamboat, from the coach
and the steamboat to the railroad, and from the railroad
to the telegraph, as these new agencies are successively
brought into use to meet the demands of increasing
157
population and wealth.
What makes Chief Justice Waite’s argument interesting is what it
lacks. For instance, he fails to note that the telegraph, unlike the
other “instrumentalities,” does not involve the transportation of
others. The line at issue was fully within the state of Florida, and he
does not distinguish between interstate and intrastate
communications, nor does he attempt to explain why a local service
158
requires federal control.
Instead, the Chief Justice looks at the
relationship between interstate commerce and the information

152. Id. at 319.
153. See Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S. (6
Otto) 1, 3-4 (1877).
154. Id.
155. Id. at 5.
156. Id. at 10.
157. Id. at 9.
158. See id. at 9-10.
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conveyed by telegraph. He finds that the telegraph is both
“instrumental” to interstate transactions and necessary for the
159
Thus, the underlying basis for the
acquisition of information.
decision was an examination of the telegraph’s effect on interstate
commerce.
However, the Court’s reaction to new developments in
160
technology was far from uniform. United States v. E.C. Knight Co.
was one of the first major antitrust cases to be considered by the
161
Court.
Here, the technological development was more abstract
but nonetheless novel, involving the centralization of production
162
In the
and the implementation of an interlocking directorate.
case, American Sugar Refining Company swapped stock with its
four main competitors, thus obtaining control over ninety-eight
163
percent of refined sugar production.
Unlike Pensacola Telegraph, the Court, led by Chief Justice
Fuller, begins by articulating some discrete limits upon the
Commerce Clause. First, he finds that intrastate restraints upon
164
trade are properly regulated per the states’ police power. Then,
in a separate argument, he relies upon a narrow definition of
commerce, which includes purchase, sale or transport but which
165
excludes manufacture. Chief Justice Fuller’s principal concern is
the danger of unlimited federal power, and he is more concerned
with the effect upon federal power than the effect of the monopoly
166
itself.
Part of the Court’s resistance to federal power may be ascribed
to its discomfort with the institutions involved. To sidestep a
determination of the sugar trust’s effect upon the national
economy, Chief Justice Fuller observes, “It will be perceived how
far-reaching the proposition is that the power of dealing with a
monopoly directly may be exercised by the general government
whenever interstate or international commerce may be ultimately
167
affected.”
Thus, when Chief Justice Fuller makes his final

159.
160.
161.

Id. at 10.
156 U.S. 1 (1894).
MARTIN J. SKLAR, THE CORPORATE RECONSTRUCTION OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 1890-1916 124-27 (1988).
162. Id. at 98, 124.
163. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 3, 6 (1894).
164. Id. at 11.
165. Id. at 14 (quoting Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1888)).
166. Id. at 13-14.
167. Id. at 13.
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analysis, he ignores the broader effect of the trust, noting that the
stock transactions and the manufacturing at issue was solely
168
intrastate.
In dissent, Justice Harlan revisits many of the previously
identified themes. Like in Cooley, Justice Harlan examines whether
169
state power is sufficient to handle the issue.
He observes that
states have power to regulate intrastate monopolies, but that the
170
Like in Pensacola
sugar trust’s control has national scope.
Telegraph, Justice Harlan examines the effects of the new
technology—here, the monopolizing trust. Rather than confining
his inquiry to the site of the manufacturing, or to the site of the
stock transactions, he looks to the effect of the trust as a whole,
connecting the powers of the directorate to the means of
171
production.
E.C. Knight is indicative of the boundaries that had evolved in
Commerce Clause doctrine. Chief Justice Fuller represents the
172
static, but orthodox,
view that required a clear separation
between federal Commerce Clause powers and state police powers.
To maintain this static distinction, the consideration of
technology’s effect upon commerce had to be limited. Justice
Harlan provided a more evolutive approach. He challenged the
status quo, reevaluating the commerce power in light of societal
change. But he also incorporated some of the core principles from
early Commerce Clause jurisprudence: Chief Justice Marshall’s
concept of a power, not limited to trade in commodities, that could
reach within the states; and Justice Curtis’ comparison of federal
and state governments’ competence to regulate their affairs.
Notwithstanding the distance between Chief Justice Fuller and
Justice Harlan, both static and evolutive principles continued to
operate upon Commerce Clause jurisprudence. In the Shreveport
Rate Cases, the Supreme Court considered the Interstate Commerce
173
Commission’s (ICC) power to control intrastate rail rates.
The
plaintiffs were two Texas-based railroad companies that charged
168. Id. at 17.
169. Id. at 42-43; see supra notes 147-51 and accompanying text.
170. Id. at 37-38, 42-43.
171. Id. at 34-35.
172. See 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS
WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION
1240-41, 1274, 1277 (8th ed. 1927); see also 1 ROTUNDA, supra note 140, § 4.6.
173. See Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. Co. v. United States (Shreveport Rate
Cases), 234 U.S. 342, 345 (1914).
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higher rates of service to Shreveport than for comparable service to
174
The difference in rates was “substantial” enough to
Texas cities.
175
place Shreveport at a competitive disadvantage to Texas ports. As
a result, the ICC ordered that the Texas carriers’ rates to
176
Shreveport be lowered to match rates in Texas.
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Hughes, held
that the Commerce Clause offered a sufficient basis for
177
congressional action.
He found that the Commerce Clause
embraced
all matters having such a close and substantial relation to
interstate traffic that the control is essential or
appropriate to the security of that traffic, to the efficiency
of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions
under which interstate commerce may be conducted
upon fair terms and without molestation or hindrance. As
it is competent for Congress to legislate to these ends,
unquestionably it may seek their attainment by requiring
that the agencies of interstate commerce shall not be used
178
in such a manner as to cripple, retard or destroy it.
In light of the purposes Justice Hughes attributes to the Commerce
Clause, it is interesting to compare the Shreveport Rate Cases with
E.C. Knight. Both cases involved monopolies; the only difference
was that the Rate Cases was strictly a geographic monopoly. Perhaps
the only material difference between the two cases was that the Rate
Cases involved railroads, a long-recognized instrumentality of
179
commerce, whereas E.C. Knight involved a corporate abstraction,
180
the monopoly trust. In addition, the Rate Cases addressed a local
phenomenon, what Justice Hughes called the “rivalries of local
181
Thus, although the issue and effect at stake were
governments.”
far less significant than that in E.C. Knight, Justice Hughes
employed sweeping language to describe Congress’ powers under
the Commerce Clause. Indeed, a determination of the effects
upon interstate commerce—in Justice Hughes’ own words, to

174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

See id. at 345-46.
Id. at 346.
Id. at 345.
Id. at 359.
Id. at 351.
E.g., Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142, 153 (1895); see also 1
ROTUNDA, supra note 140, § 4.5.
180. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. at 1.
181. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. at 350.
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182

“cripple, retard or destroy” —indicates movement back toward
the evolutive considerations Justice Harlan suggested in his prior
183
dissent.
Over twenty years later, Justice Hughes revisited those
184
The case
considerations in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.
challenged Congress’ power to impose sanctions against employers
185
for discriminatory anti-union practices. Justice Hughes begins his
analysis with an examination of the steel industry, noting its scope
186
and effect within the national economy.
Then, he states the
doctrinal theme.
The congressional authority to protect interstate
commerce from burdens and obstructions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of the “flow” of interstate
or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be
due to injurious action springing from other sources. The
fundamental principle is that the power to regulate
commerce is the power to enact ‘all appropriate
legislation’ for its ‘protection or advancement’ . . . .
Although activities may be intrastate in character when
separately considered, if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their
control is essential or appropriate to protect that
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
187
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.
Although Justice Hughes’ formulation was a revolutionary turn
188
in Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
it was not a unilateral
departure from established doctrine. Instead, it was a juncture
between two competing interpretive schemes, both of which had
existed from the inception of the Commerce Clause. Because the
evolutive principle helped define the boundaries of the Commerce
Clause, it was a meaningful—and available—analytical tool. It was

182. Id. at 351.
183. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. It must be reiterated that
Justice Hughes’ statement only referred to the “agencies” of commerce.
“Agencies” clearly included transportation, such as railroads, but the term would
not necessarily have embraced manufacturing or production. Cf. Furst v.
Brewster, 282 U.S. 493, 497-98 (1931) (examining the application of the
Commerce Clause to interstate shipping).
184. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (5-4 decision).
185. Id. at 22.
186. Id. at 27.
187. Id. at 36-37 (citations omitted).
188. See generally ROTUNDA, supra note 140, §§ 4.7, 4.9.
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not always at the center of jurisprudence doctrinally.
Nevertheless, it was better suited to address the economic and
technological issues before the Court, and thus found open
expression in Jones & Laughlin.
IV. CONCLUSION

By necessity, the development of the Commerce Clause was
driven by economic change. Even at the time of the Framing, the
concept of commerce was in flux. No discrete limitations were
placed upon the concept.
When those limitations developed, two principles emerged.
Chief Justice Marshall espoused a flexible, federal power; Justice
Curtis sought to preserve the states’ powers. The scope of state
power was not only defined in terms of police power, but also in
terms of federal and state competence to regulate economic issues.
Modern economic institutions tested these limits by exerting
influence that exceeded state control. To respond to these
changes, practical, evolutive principles were incorporated into
Commerce Clause doctrine.
These principles contrast with originalism. By setting a
historical foundation for constitutional interpretation, it aspires for
a fair and consistent adjudicative standard—a standard that does
not evolve over time, but instead anchors itself to an age of

189. Without further elucidation, this proposition risks a glib dismissal of
much of pre-New Deal Commerce Clause jurisprudence. There are two deeper
philosophical issues at play here, and both of them fall beyond the scope of this
paper.
First, and most significantly, is the problem of how precedent controls
constitutional law. Here, the question is what principles will allow the reevaluation
or reversal of constitutional doctrine. See generally Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare
Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
570 (2001); Gary Lawson, The Constitutional Case Against Precedent, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 23 (1994).
A related, but separate, problem is the difficulty of deriving a broad principle
from a limited survey of caselaw. To borrow an analogy from science, the analysis
relies upon a limited number of experimental results—here, the selected cases—
to describe a governing principle. A more intensive survey of cases, or more
“experimental results,” would help flesh out the principle. On the other hand,
microscopic examination can obscure important, larger principles. Although this
paper attempts to strike a balance between the two extremes, further
consideration of caselaw is an appropriate test of the thesis. Certainly, some cases
interrupt the trends that this paper identifies. See, e.g., South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437, 463 (1905) (Brewer, J.) (holding that federal taxation of stateoperated liquor sales was permissible under the Commerce Clause).
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certainties. But as demonstrated by the sweep of case law from
Gibbons to Jones & Laughlin, every time a doctrine confronts a new
idea—regardless of whether that doctrine is static or evolutive—it is
reformed. In the course of the survey, it is particularly interesting
to note how rarely the intent of the Framers is relied upon, much
less adverted to.
Nevertheless, the step away from certainty, from an absolute
principle, is precipitous. Certainly, some commentators correctly
point out that complete reliance upon a dynamic approach,
190
without some underlying, controlling principle, is dangerous.
But law is not produced in an academic vacuum. For law to be
legitimate, it requires the legal community to accept its principles,
191
even though it may be far from agreement on its application.
Thus, precedent, reasoning, tradition, and consistency still
192
maintain valued and necessary roles in the development of law.
Returning to the beginning of the paper, Llewellyn noted the
193
“inconvenience” of power that cannot be strictly constrained.
However, he goes on to say, “Yet the greater inconvenience lies in
obfuscation of those vibrant tails which have become the things
194
that count in life.” It is the “vibrant tail,” the modern experience,
that requires constitutional law to continue responding to, and
serving, a changing society.

190. See Tribe, supra note 22, at 1298 n. 247 (finding that a dynamic evaluation
of constitutional norms “seems more than a bit schizophrenic”).
191. See Donald H.J. Hermann, Legal Reasoning as Argumentation, 12 N. KY. L.
REV. 467, 469 (1985) (“[L]egal reasoning . . . is dependent upon the legal
conclusion and the reasons given in support of it being accepted by the audience
or constituency to which such argumentation is directed.”).
192. See Stanley Mosk, The Common Law and the Judicial Decision-Making Process,
11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 35, 40-41 (1988).
193. See supra text accompanying note 1.
194. Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 15-16. For more information about Karl
Llewellyn’s impact on the law, see N.E.H. Hull, The Romantic Realist: Art, Literature,
and the Enduring Legacy of Karl Llewellyn’s “Jurisprudence,” 40 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 115
(1996).
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